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Abstract. This article describes an ontological model of norms. The basic assumption is that a
substantial part of a legal system is grounded on the concept of agency. Since a legal system aims at
regulating a society, then its goal can be achieved only by affecting the behaviour of the members
of the society. We assume that a society is made up of agents (which can be individuals, institu-
tions, software programs, etc.), that agents have beliefs, goals and preferences, and that they
commit to intentions in order to choose a line of behaviour. The role of norms, within a legal
system, is to specify how and when the chosen behaviour agrees with the basic principles of the
legal system. In this article, we show how a model based on plans can be the basis for the
ontological representation of norms, which are expressed as constraints on the possible plans an
agent may choose to guide its behaviour. Moreover, the paper describes how the proposed model
can be linked to the upper level of a philosophically well-founded ontology (DOLCE); in this way,
the model is set in a wider perspective, which opens the way to further developments.
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1. Introduction
The role of ontologies in computer science is to provide a formal description
of the world. They aim at enabling a machine to find out relevant infor-
mation from documents, to recognize described situations, to draw conclu-
sions on the basis of known facts, etc. In this context, it is not relevant that
the description refers to the world ‘as it is’ (true ontology, in the classical
view), but what is important is that it represents the world as it is conceived
by sentient beings (epistemology): so far as an ontological structure is
embodied in a computational agent, it represents the way that agent sees the
world, but to the extent where that structure is shared among a community
of agents, it represents the way the community sees the world, and if the
ontology is also used in man/machine communication, it must share with
humans some basic ideas about the way the world is organized (Breuker and
Winkels In press).
So, an ontology must be properly founded, in order to make possible this
multiple sharing. But often ontologies are used in applications concerning
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specific domains, so that the proper foundations must be linked to domain
conceptualizations. However, it is not clear how this link can be achieved. A
first problem concerns the layman/expert point of view. Obviously, a phy-
sician has a very different view of what is a human body (and how it works)
than a non-physician. So, it may be assumed that an ontology devoted to the
medical field must be able to express the view of the physician, in order to put
at her/his disposal, when needed, the vast body of knowledge concerned, for
instance, with the liver, or with what an illness is.1 On the other hand, a
physician must be able to talk with her/his patients: this often requires a
rephrasing of complex medical descriptions in (possibly imprecise, but
understandable) non-technical terms. And s/he must also be able to
understand what are the symptoms, even if they are not described by the
patient in the most proper way. This happens in many fields, and it is
especially important in the legal field, where many legal concepts are inex-
tricably linked to the commonsense view of the world. This produces two,
partially related, effects: first, in legal documents, as well as in the Statutes,
there may appear terms (as window, water, tree), which are not defined in the
legal systems, so that it is assumed that the definition is borrowed from a
general ontology; second, some concepts, which are of common use (such as
property, person, duty), are changed by a legal system by means of a body of
definitions and norms appearing in the system, so that the jurist’s view of a
‘person’ is not exactly the same as the layman’s view.
The goal of this paper is twofold: first, to show how commonsense con-
cepts (in particular, action and behaviour) can be linked to legal concepts (in
particular, norms and rules); second, to show how the resulting structure can
be linked to a properly founded top-level ontology. It must be clear that
we do not aim at covering the ontological status of all types of rules. For
instance, in a legal system, there are rules concerning the definition of con-
cepts (e.g. Non Governative Organization) and rules concerning the way a
given institutional role can be established (e.g. the Secretary of an NGO), and
which are its attributions. We are not concerned with definitions, since we
assume they are given in advance, and already included in the ontology. But
we are (at least partially) concerned with institutional roles and their attri-
butions, since institutional roles, as authorities, are a (predefined) category of
people, and their attributions define what they can and cannot do. Also, we
are not concerned with the way a Court gives a verdict, which is a very
complex process, but we are concerned with the presence, in the ontology, of
all the concepts required to describe the facts and the evidence available to
the court. In other words, this paper faces a small but relevant fraction of the
legal knowledge:2 it covers the norms of conduct, i.e., the norms that specify
what a legal actor can and cannot do. The claim is that these rules express
constraints on actions, and their relevance stands on the view that a legal
system aims at organizing a society in such a way that the rights and duties of
GUIDO BOELLA ET AL.318
individuals and organizations are properly balanced, on the basis of superior
principles. And these rights and duties are expressed in terms of norms of
conduct. The article shows that the same approach can be applied to the
modelling of legal powers; in this case, the constraints refer to the plans that
must be executed to establish new rights and duties.
We must point out that we do not aim just at describing norm-related
concepts, but also at showing how norms affect behaviour. In other words,
the formalization of prescriptive rules is assumed to be available to an agent
that must do things, and that must choose what to do: this agent uses the
rules to decide what he will do next; in principle, he will choose a line of
action that complies with the existing rules, but in some cases he may decide
that a rule is not worth being respected, either because it is in conflict with
other norms, or because the risk of being sanctioned is low. Although this
behaviour is only partially moral, it is the way many rational agents choose
to act: it must be properly modelled, since it explicitly includes the concept of
sanction, and, implicitly, guides the legislator to properly choose the sanction
associated with a given rule.
The paper is organized as follows: the next section presents the upper-level
of the ontology (DOLCE), and our formalization of plans; in the third sec-
tion, the representation of norms is described; the fourth section shows how
power and authorities fit our approach; in Section 5, we present a case study
addressing the legal concept of ‘fruit’; then, we compare our approach with
other ontological models of the legal systems and, in Section 7, we present
some ontological models of plans; the conclusions close the paper.
2. The upper-level of the ontology, and the plans
In order to introduce our model of plans and norms into a well-founded
ontology, we have chosen, as our starting point, the DOLCE ontology
(Gangemi et al. 2002). The main advantage of DOLCE is the clear philo-
sophical foundation of its basic categories: they have been selected as the
result of a research effort that has lasted for some years, and the motivations
for the final choices can be found in the referenced papers, and can be traced
back to various previous proposals (Guarino 1998; Gangemi et al. 2001;
Welty and Guarino 2001; Guarino and Welty 2002). Most of the structures
addressed in the paper are based on the KIF implementation reported in
(Masolo et al. 2003).
2.1. DOLCE
Without entering in any detail (the interested reader is addressed to the
original papers), we report here some brief comments on the top-level of
ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF PLANS AND NORMS 319
DOLCE, which seem necessary in order to explain the connections to
plans and norms. Some of the concepts defined in DOLCE are depicted in
Figure 1.
The upper-level categories are Abstract, Quality, Situation, Endurant, and
Perdurant. The assumption about the existence of abstract entities and
qualities is rather common (with the known philosophical intricacies). The
distinction between Endurants3 and Perdurants can be specified by citing the
authors:
‘‘Endurants are wholly present (i.e., all their proper parts are present) at
any time they are present. Perdurants, on the other hand, just extend in
time by accumulating different temporal parts, so that, at any time they
are present, they are only partially present, in the sense that some of their
proper temporal parts (e.g. their previous or future phases) may be not
present’’ (Gangemi et al. 2002, Section 2.1).
In our words, which could not be shared by the authors, this means that the
most relevant structuring of endurants is in space (so they extend in full
across time), while the most relevant structuring of perdurants is in time (so
they are cut in parts by the flow of time).
Situation refers to states of affairs (SOA). According to the authors, other
names used in the literature for a Situation are setting, Gestalt, or configu-
ration. Example of Situation are a clinical condition, a murder, and a speed
excess case. It is interesting to note that in the Documentation of Situation [in
the KIF knowledge base (Gangemi et al. 2003, p. 195)], it is stated that
situations ‘‘could be equivalently modelled as a special complex perdurant
defined through its relations to qualities, regions, and endurants’’. Situations
satisfy Descriptions, in particular S-Descriptions (situation description), see
Entity
Endurant Perdurant 
FactRegion Set 
Situation Quality Abstract 
Physical-
Endurant 
Non-physical 
   -endurant 
EventStative
Achievement 
Accomplishment State
Process
Description Non-physical 
   -object 
S-Description C-Description 
Physical 
-Object 
  Agentive- 
physical-object Non-agentive-physical-object 
Amount-of-
matter Feature
Arbitrary 
  -sum
Action 
Figure 1. A portion of the upper level of DOLCE [from Masolo et al. (2003)].
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Figure 1. In our interpretation, a situation is the ‘actual’ counterpart of a
representation (description), i.e., a piece of reality, if one is a realist.
2.2. PLANS
Descriptions, which are non-physical endurants, are particularly important in
this article, since, in DOLCE, plans are S-Descriptions (see Figure 2). So,
Plans are particular descriptions of situations. This placement reflects a view
where plans describe something; although we would rather take a plan as the
situation which is described, in order to maintain the compatibility with
DOLCE, we focus in this article on the description view. However, we must
point out that we do not consider an actual plan as something occurring in
the world, but rather as a ‘mental’ situation. It consists in the abstract object
(the ‘idea’) that is associated with ‘potential’ occurrences of events. Conse-
quently, DOLCE’s Plan is taken as the mental description of this object, a
description which (in DOLCE’s terms) is represented-by a MentalInforma-
tionObject which, in its turn, is realized-by a given configuration of brain
neurons. This is a very strong ontological commitment, which would require
a lengthy discussion which, for the sake of brevity, we must omit here.
What is known about Plans in DOLCE is that they are composed of Tasks
and include some Functional-Roles; moreover, there is a Planning-activity,
which is sequenced-by various types of Tasks. Actually, we must be clear
about what we mean by Plan. In particular, we must keep apart three dif-
ferent views on plans:
1. The description(s) which an agent is reasoning about while he is trying
to decide what to do (one or more partially specified plan schemas).
2. The intention, i.e., a single, possibly still underspecified, sequence of
steps which the agent has decided will drive her/his behaviour.
3. The execution of a plan, i.e., the actual, real-world, events that the
agent carries out.
C-Description 
p-preconditions 
p-effects 
PartiallyDescribed
  Entity
S-Participant 
 
 Plan
refines 
Component 
Task 
S-Description 
Figure 2. The placement of Plan in the ontology.
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What appears in Figure 2 is the first view of plans, so that it can be
imagined as a tree-like structure, where some decisions have been already
taken, while others are suspended. For example, I may know about plans for
travelling to far cities. And I may have the goal of being in Rome tomorrow.
So I can examine the plans ‘‘go to a far city by train’’ and ‘‘go to a far city by
plane’’ (two different plan schemas). If I have chosen the second schema, then
I have certainly fixed the ‘airport of arrival’ and the ‘airport of departure’
(i.e., two of the participants in the plan), but, possibly, the departure time is
just given as ‘some time in the morning of tomorrow before 8.00 a.m.’, i.e.,
an underspecified description of the ‘departure time’ participant. Also note
that a different plan is obtained when I have reserved the seat, since at that
time the ‘‘departure time’’ has been fixed: this new plan is a plan ‘more
specific’ than (refines, in DOLCE’s terms) the original one (see Figure 3).
With respect to Figure 2, we note that:
• Apart from the standard subcategory arcs (thick arrows), some other
arcs have been introduced. They refer to relations in the definition, and
are shown as thin arrows with a small box. The shapes that substitute the
boxes in p-preconditions and p-effects are just a shorthand, to keep more
compact the next figures. Each relation has a name shown near the box;
the arrow enters a category, which specifies the range of the relation; this
is an adaptation of the KL-One notation (Brachman and Schmolze
1985), which complies with the KIF implementation of DOLCE; in
Appendix A, we report an example of how a standard ontological
language (i.e., LOOMMacGregor 1991; MacGregor and Brill 1991) can
be used to express the concepts and relations appearing in the drawings.
refines 
refines 
Go-to-a-far-city-via-plane
(‘Torino’, ‘Roma’, ‘Caselle’, 
‘Fiumicino’, 7.20, 8.30) 
Go-to-a-far-city-via-plane
(‘Torino’, ‘Roma’, ‘Caselle’, 
‘Fiumicino’, < 8.00, arrTime)
Go-to-a-far-city-via-plane
(depCity, arrCity, depAirport, 
arrAirport, depTime, arrTime)
Figure 3. Plans and more-specific plans.
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• The range of p-preconditions and p-effects is S-Description. This is a
partial description of a state; it can be seen as an underdetermined state,
where some characteristics are fixed, while others are left unspecified. In
DOLCE, precondition is a relation between S-Descriptions and situa-
tions. We believe that is more homogeneous to maintain a relation
between S-Descriptions; of course, the S-Description which acts as
p-precondition will be satisfied-by DOLCE’s precondition. For example,
the plan of going Rome by plane is executable if the S-Description ‘‘The
Rome Airport is open’’ is satisfied by the current Situation.
• s-participant specifies the entities involved in the plan; its range is
PartiallyDescribedEntity. This is the role taken by a C-Descriptions (i.e.,
the Descriptions which describe anything which is not a Situation) in a
planning context; C-Descriptions describe entities having some proper-
ties, or being in some relations with other known entities (the event that
happened to me in some place at a given time, the platypus I saw in the
Sydney park). Participants in plans need not be completely specified (I
will take a taxi), but they can be described more or less precisely (I will
take a yellow taxi with an old, experienced driver). The extension of a
PartiallyDescribedEntity is a set of Endurants, such that the actual
participant in the plan must belong to this set. The dotted oval
associated with PartiallyDescribedEntity refers to its being a material
role (see Guarino and Welty 2000): no new entity has come into being,
but an existing one plays a new role (as when a person enrols in a
University s/he takes the material role of student).
Of course, many features of the plan ontology have been left out, but the
goal of this paper is mainly to address the role of norms in the planning
framework, so only the concepts necessary to enable us to specify the rela-
tionship between plans and norms have been described.
2.3. PLANNING
As stated above, plans are the objects that are managed in the process
of planning. In Appendix B, the interested reader may find a sketch of
an ontological representation of how planning may be carried out. In
Figure 4, instead, we refrain from going into the structure of the planning
action, but we simply represent the elements that affect that action. Intu-
itively, the idea is that Thinking is a Perdurant which has as participants the
descriptions embodied in the brain. In particular, Planning is that type of
Thinking that works upon the mental representation of plans. It produces
new Plans by considering4 known Plans (going to Rome by bus), by spe-
cializing existing Plans (the taxi company has been chosen), or by dis-
carding Plans (see the comments about the PLANET system in Section 7).
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What is shown in Figure 4 is just the final outcome of this process, i.e., the
fact that a plan has become an Intention. No Intention concept is currently
defined in DOLCE, but has-BDI-on is a modality-target relation holding
between an Agent-role and a course (of events). Since Plans are composed
of Tasks, i.e., a specific type of Course, and who plans plays an Agent-role
with respect to the planning action, we call Intention the role assumed by
the sequence of Tasks which the planning agent has chosen. Correspond-
ingly, we call has-intention-on the subrelation of has-BDI-on which refers to
intentions (wrt. beliefs and desires). Although this is the actual picture in
DOLCE (and we comply with it in Figure 4), in order to simplify the
subsequent figures, we will merge the Plan and the associated Complex-
Task. Consequently, in the following, we assume that Plan embodies also
the Tasks it is composed of.
Notes to Figure 4:
• There are two effects of Planning: a Complex-task associated with a Plan
has become an Intention, and the planning agent holds that intention
(has-intention-on). The black rectangle on the effects arc is just used to
keep together the various effects (it is just a logical And); the ‘‘+’’ on the
arcs exiting the black rectangle mean that these are positive effects: they
did not hold before the action, and they hold after the action.
• The in-mind-of relation holds among a (mental) C-description and an
Agent-role. It means that the Endurant playing that role has in its brain a
physical representation of that description.
• Intention is a material role that is played by the ComplexTask. The circle
on the arc has no special function, except as a graphical means to specify
that that arc is one of the effects.
=
component 
Complex 
  -task
Plan 
has-intention-on +
+ 
Intention 
p-effect-of
in-mind-of has-agent
Agent-role 
Course 
Planning 
Activity
C-Description 
Figure 4. The Planning activity.
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• The diamond on the arc exiting from Intention is a constraint on the
relations: it specifies that the two elements identified by the dotted
arrows exiting the ‘=’ box must be the same individual. The first of them
is the Agent-role such that the entity playing that role ‘has in mind’ the
Intention, and the second is the Agent-role of the Planning which has
produced that Intention.5 In other word, in this model, agents plan for
themselves (p-effect-of is just the inverse relation of p-effects).
What is not represented in Figure 4 is the role of Intention in driving
behaviour: agents always act; so, if the current time is ti, then agent A is doing
something at ti and will try to do something at ti+1; what is that something is
specified by A’s current intention.
2.4. UTILITIES
Since, during planning, an agent considers many Plans, but just one of them
becomes his Intention, he needs some way to decide which one of two (or
more) Plans is the best. The model presented here is based on the assumption
that:
• The choice is based on the agent’s preferences;
• The preferences are applied to states that can be originated (either
directly or indirectly) by the execution of the plan;
• From a computational point of view, applying the preferences to a state
amounts to evaluating the utility of that state;
In our view, these three criteria characterize the rationality of agents. The
use of utilities in the planning activity has been described elsewhere (Boella
and Lesmo 2002). Here, some comments are needed on the second point. In
fact, the reason why the preferences are not necessarily applied to (i.e., the
utility is not necessarily evaluated on) the state directly resulting from the
execution of the plan, is one if the key features of our approach to norms.
In general, the execution of a plan has certain effects on the environment
(as specified by the plan p-effects). But the new situation that obtains can also
produce further foreseeable changes. This is especially true in case the world
is populated by other agents, who may interact with the planning agent. So, it
seems reasonable to try to imagine how the world would be after some
sequence of reactions from the environment. This is similar to what happens
(in a very simplified way) in two-players games, where a player must evaluate
his moves in terms of the subsequent possible moves of the opponent; it is
clear that the ability of foreseeing in advance the evolutions of the game (for
two or more moves) is one of the keys for finding a successful strategy.
So, the utility of a plan is evaluated on the basis of the state that obtains
after the execution of the plan, and after some re-actions of the environment
to the state that obtains (we assume here a two-level lookahead: plan
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execution + reaction). The major point is that the environment is assumed to
be able to react to the breach of norms; so, in order to model the behaviour of
an agent, what is needed is a way to specify how the environment reacts to
such a situation. Note that we have used the very general term ‘environment’;
this leaves unspecified which are the relevant component of such an envi-
ronment. Currently, we assume the existence of a Normative-Agent-Role, who
has to enforce the respect of law. However, this agent can be a single indi-
vidual (a policeman) or a social body (the set of other agents surrounding
the planning agent). Moreover, the presence of normative agents does not
exclude that the respect of a norm is a value ‘per se’, i.e., it is embodied in
preferences of the agent.
3. Norms
Since law is a social construction, its bases lie on the interaction among
agents. It has convincingly been argued that these interactions can be gov-
erned by some ‘legal relations’, and that all legal relations can be expressed in
terms of four basic relations (Hohfeld 1919; Allen and Saxon 1995). So, we
start our presentation by showing how the basic legal relations fit our overall
framework (see also Boella et al. 2001). The four legal relations are: DUTY,
RIGHT, NO-RIGHT, and PRIVILEGE. They are defined in terms of two
interacting agents and of an action, in the following way:
1. X has the RIGHT that Y performs A, iff in case Y does not perform
A, X may react with an action R such that Y is negatively affected by
R.
2. Y has the DUTY to perform A for X, iff the same condition as the
one above holds (i.e., DUTY is the ‘‘opposite’’ of RIGHT, where the
roles of the two agents are interchanged).
3. X has NO-RIGHT that Y performs A, iff in case Y does not perform
A, X may not react with an action R such that Y is negatively affected
by R (so NO-RIGHT is the ‘‘inverse’’ of RIGHT, where the possible
reaction is not allowed, i.e., negated).
4. Y has the PRIVILEGE to perform A with respect to X, iff in case Y
does perform A, X may not react with an action R such that Y is nega-
tively affected by R (so, PRIVILEGE is the ‘‘converse’’ of the ‘‘inverse’’
of the ‘‘opposite’’ of RIGHT, where we take ‘‘converse’’ to refer to the
execution of A by Y, instead to the failure to execute A, as in all other
relations).
Three comments. First, there are three parameters that come into play: the
perspective (i.e., if we look at the relation from the point of view of X or Y;
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what Hohfeld calls ‘‘opposites’’), the possibility to react (‘‘inverse’’), and the
fact that the definition refers to Y doing or not A (what we have called
‘‘converse’’). It seems that ‘‘converse’’ is not strictly required, and it is
introduced just to conform to a linguistic view (the existence of the term
‘‘privilege’’). And in fact, just four relations are defined and not all eight
combinations. Second, what can be done and what cannot be done have to be
interpreted in terms of legal rules. This can be extended to general moral rules,
but cannot be interpreted in terms of factual ability of agents. So, nobody has
the RIGHT to rob you just because if you don’t give him the money, he ‘‘can’’
react by hurting you. Furthermore, also in case you actually have a RIGHT
towards somebody, your reaction to non-compliance may not be ‘‘any’’
reaction, but it is further constrained. Third, in the common use of the terms
that refer to the legal relations, they are not always ‘directed’ (Herrestad and
Krogh 1995), i.e., they do not involve two agents, but just one. The correct
interpretation of single-agent relations is obtained from DUTY and PRIVI-
LEGE by quantifying over X: for DUTY, there exists an X that may react (or
a set of X’s, having predefined features, e.g. policemen); for PRIVILEGE no
such X does exist (notice that the negation has wider scope than the quanti-
fier). What one should not say is ‘‘I have the right to do that’’, since in this
context the correct expression is ‘‘I have the privilege to do that’’.
We can now return to our planning-intention perspective. From this
perspective, Hohfeld’s approach tells us that, in case an action is a single
actor one there are two possibilities: constraints and absence of constraints
(DUTY and PRIVILEGE). But duties can also be ‘directed’ (and in such a
case, they can be called ‘rights’ from the perspective of the other agent) and
negated (no-rights): again, constraints and absence of constraints, although
expressed in a slightly different way. It may be argued that privileges6 are
useless (although it is useful to have a linguistic term for them, of course): if
no constraint exists about an action, then the privilege is automatically
obtained, without having to state it explicitly: privileges should not be part of
legal (or moral) systems. However, they are useful for at least three reasons.
First, they help in determining if an agent is liable for having done some-
thing: if the privilege is stated explicitly, then one does not need to search for
all possible constraints related to the involved action. Second, rules are often
organized in a taxonomy; so a rule could state that all agents of a given
category (call it C) and being in a given situation type (S), have the duty to do
A; but it may be the case that the rule does not apply to a specific subcategory
of C (i.e., C’) or does not apply in a given subtype of S (i.e., S’) or both (Lex
Specialis). So, one can say that, although, in general, the members of C have
the duty to do A, the members of C’ (or the members of C, if they are in a
situation of type S’) have the privilege not to do A. Note that we are not
claiming this is the way an actual legal system works, but rather an ideali-
zation of it. In general there could not be an exhaustive coverage of all
ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF PLANS AND NORMS 327
situations, so that in real systems, privileges are even more important than in
their idealized counterparts. The third, and perhaps the most important
reason for the explicit statement of privileges depends on the hierarchical
organization of the authorities able to enact laws: if a higher power wants to
prevent that a lower power unduly constrains the behaviour of the entities
subject to the law, it can state that these entities have some privileges: if the
Constitution states that citizens have the privilege to express freely their
political opinion, then no state or regional law can state the opposite (at least
in principle).
With respect to the placement of the legal relations in the ontology,
DOLCE states that they are subcategories of Modal-Description (which are
S-Descriptions), and have as a component a Functional-role (e.g. an Agent-
role), which is in a specific Modal-relation with some Course (i.e., a course of
events). The modal relations are has-right-on, has-not-right-on, has-duty-of,
has-privilege-of. All Modal-Descriptions are parts of an S-Description includ-
ing two components: the first of them is a Functional-role and has as
Modality-Target the second one (a Course). In other words, a Duty, for
instance, is the description of a situation involving some action (a course of
events is something that describes an action) which an agent (role) has the
duty to perform.7 This approach seems to be logic-biased, where a Modal-
Description recalls a formula in deontic logic. On the contrary, we are more
agent-oriented, so that we need to associate with legal relations some more
information, i.e., the author of the norm and the sanction. Also, the relation
between Norm and Plan has to be made more explicit. Moreover, power-
related relations (see Section 4) are also viewed as Modal-Descriptions, while
it seems more reasonable, according to the usual analyses, to take them as
relating an agent to another legal relation, which is the p-effect of the asso-
ciated plan.
With respect to norms, in DOLCE, Norm is a subcategory of Regulation;
Norms have the function of constraining Perdurants, and their relationship
with legal relations is rather indirect. In our model, we assume that the legal
relations are subcategories of Norm in that they specify (describe) particular
constraints on behaviour (activities).
Let us now introduce an example. As we have seen, a Plan has p-
preconditions and p-effects. Let’s consider a plan schema. Its p-preconditions
pose some constraints on the applicability of the plan. Therefore, the
p-preconditions for cooking spaghetti with garlic, oil, and chili pepper
(GO&CP), is to have spaghetti, oil, chili pepper, water (to boil the spaghetti),
a pan, and some fire (a very easy recipe). As it is usual, p-preconditions are
conditions that prevent the action from being executable (physical, or prac-
tical conditions). But it could happen that the King of That Kingdom has
prohibited this recipe. Or, perhaps, this prohibition applies just to dinners
with more than seven participants, or to dinners served after midnight, and
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so on. Also, in some situations (here and now) garlic could not be a nice
ingredient (because of its side-effects on your breath); or you know that one
of your guests does not like chili pepper. All of these are not p-preconditions:
if you have all the things you need, you can cook them in all situations
described above (may be you are a spaghetti revolutionary, or you are not
very polite). Anyway, these rules constrain your freedom to cook spaghetti
GO&CP; you can pay for that: the King may imprison you, you may lose a
kiss from your love (who does not appreciate, for this night, the smell of your
mouth), or your guests may decide that they will never accept another
invitation from you.
The ‘‘norms’’ we have exemplified above are not p-preconditions, but
constraints on plans. We stress that in all of these examples, the utility of that
recipe is reduced by the presence of the norm, so, it is possible that in absence
of the norms, your intention for tonight dinner is to cook spaghetti GO &
CP, but in presence of one or more of these norms, your intention is to
prepare rice with mushrooms: you have chosen a different plan, whose utility
is lower than the plan of spaghetti without norms, but is higher than the plan
of spaghetti with norms (since the norm reduces the utility). The problem,
now, is how to express the norms.
Let us consider the case of the King’s prohibition in its basic form
(independent of the number of participants and of daytime). The rule in-
volves three or four elements: the involved plan, the authority who posed the
norm, and the agent who is taken as responsible for the execution of the
action; the fourth element is not strictly required, but it is very common: it is
the sanction8 the agent will undergo in case he does not respect the rule. So, a
norm is not a plan, but ‘refers’ to a plan, in the sense that it (as a description)
includes (is related to) a description of the action (i.e., the plan) which is
forbidden (or permitted).
In Figure 5, we introduce the basic notions related to norms, and apply
them to our spaghetti example. In this example, we introduce instances.
They are represented as rectangles. However, see below for some comments
on the distinction between classes and instances. Instances are linked to the
category which they belong to via a thick dotted arrow. In the figure, it is
stated that
1. Norms are a subcategory of S-Description. This should not be confused
with the written law which is just a physical way to express the descrip-
tion: it is a medium for communicating the norm, not the norm itself.
In fact, not all norms are written: they can be transmitted via verbal
traditions and customs.
2. Norms have a topic,9 the Plan the norm is about.
3. Norms have a polarity. Its range is the abstract set composed of the
two elements pos and neg. If the value of polarity is pos, then the norm
ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF PLANS AND NORMS 329
refers to something an agent must do, otherwise (as in our example), it
refers to something he must not do. In other words, if the polarity is
pos, an agent X has the DUTY to do the action; if it is neg, it has the
DUTY not to perform the action.10
4. Every Norm has a bearer. More precisely, it has a set of bearers: usu-
ally, norms apply to categories of agents, and not to single individuals.
As usual, a relation arc enters another concept: that concept is associ-
ated to the set of potential bearers of the given norm.
5. Every Plan has an actor, who is the ‘main character’ of the plan.
Although the actor of the plan is conceptually distinct from the plan-
ning agent, we assume, in the current model, that the two roles are
played by the same individual (see Figure 4, and the comments in the
text).11 In the present example, we assume that the host of the dinner
is the actor of the plan of serving GO&CP; so, he also is the agent that
must decide about the recipe for the dinner (the planning agent).
6. The actor of a plan, if that plan happens to be the topic of the Norm,
and if that actor is of the right category, becomes an (individual) bearer
of the rule. Of course, this applies also during the planning phase, so
that the planning agent, which is a potential bearer, may discard the
plan not to become an actual bearer. The identification of the actor with
the bearer may appear as an oversimplification, but see (Kralingen et al.
1999, p. 1136): ‘‘The fourth slot is reserved for the agent who performs
the act (the agent and the norm subject must be the same person)’’.
7. Every Norm is associated with a sanction,12 which is a PlanWith
Patient, i.e., belongs to that subclass of Plan which is in some
has-patient relation with an individual playing a Patient-Role.
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Figure 5. Norms and plans.
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8. The bearer of the Norm is the has-patient of its sanction. Of course, this
does not take into account the notion of responsibility, but we assume
that being an agent who freely chose a given line of behaviour is the
basis for further elaborations of this concept.
9. The author of a norm is an Authority (see Section 6).
With respect to the distinction between categories and instances, a few
words are in order. The intuition is rather simple, and well known from
decades of research on AI and KR: in standard model theory there are
individuals and relations; an instance is an individual of the model, while a
category corresponds to a one-place relation (expressed in logics as a one-
place predicate). So, we have to define the individuals in our model. Clearly
enough, the King is an individual (in particular, an Endurant), as well as
the abstract entity neg. What about norms and plans? Is the single norm
NoSpaghettiGO&CP an individual? It depends on the way we use it in a
reasoning framework. If we have to discuss a case, then we have to apply
the norm to the description of the case; in doing that, we must bind the
variables (roles) associated with the norm; in particular, we must bind
the bearer. In doing that we obtain an entity which is more specific than
NoSpaghettiGO&CP, but seems to be of the same ‘type’. So, it seems more
appropriate that NoSpaghettiGO&CP be a category, whose instances are the
various applications of the norm to real cases. However, if we refer to the
norm as a description, then NoSpaghettiGO&CP is an individual, i.e., a single
individual description, which may be in a refines relation to another indi-
vidual norm description. The case of plans is even more striking: is the plan
GO&CP an individual or a set, i.e., the set of all executions of the plan? The
solution we propose is the same as above, but here we have three levels,
instead of two: there are various descriptions of the GO&CP plan (instances
of Plan); there is the execution of the plan (an instance of a Perdurant); but
we also have the particular plan the planning agent has chosen (its Intention,
which is a Complex-Task; see Figure 4).
4. Authorities: the legal relations concerning Power
Traditionally, law scholars like (Hart 1961) distinguish between primary
laws, whose purpose is to direct the behaviour of citizens, and secondary
laws, which, among other functions, serve to the maintenance and dynamic
management of the normative system. These rules form a ‘‘subsystem of
rules for change’’: rules which have legal effects and which are instrumental
to the primary system, in that they regulate the regulation [e.g., art. 2 of
Italian Civil Code: ‘‘the creation of laws [...] is regulated by constitutional
laws (Cost. 70)’’]. This subsystem, according to Hart, does not include only
ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF PLANS AND NORMS 331
the rules of change which specify how new laws are introduced or old ones
removed, but it also includes rules about ‘‘powers for the private citizen’’.
These rules are at the basis of civil code and regulate testaments and
contracts; for Hart they allow the exercise of limited legislative powers by
the citizens. These rules do not create or remove general laws but they
introduce and remove individual obligations and permissions: e.g., in the
Italian Civil Code, art. 1173 (sources of obligations) specifies that obliga-
tions are created by contracts (a contract being an agreement among two
or more parties to regulate a legal relationship about valuables by art.
1321).
In Hohfeld’s framework, this distinction is reflected by the introduction,
beyond the four Legal Relations we discussed in Section 3 (RIGHT, DUTY,
NO-RIGHT, PRIVILEGE), of the relations of POWER, INABILITY,
LIABILITY, IMMUNITY. They concern actions affecting the existing Legal
Relations. In our terms, the topic of this particular type of rules is that
subcategory of Plan whose instances have, among their effects, a modification
of a Legal Relation. As we have seen in Figure 5, Duty is viewed as a special
subcategory of Norm. Accordingly, it seems reasonable to assume that
alsoPowers are particular subcategories of Norm. So, we get:
1. Duty, Right, No-Right, Privilege, Power, Inability, Liability, Immunity
are specific subcategories of Norm ( just Duty, Privilege, and Power are
shown in the figure).
2. Some Plans have as their effect ConstraintsOnBehavior, which is a spe-
cific subtype of S-Description. They are JurPlans andLawPlans.13 The
difference is that JurPlans establish new IndividualConstraintsOnBehav-
ior, while LawPlans establish new Norms. An example of JurPlan is
‘renting a car’, where, if the plan is executed correctly and by a person
who can do it (according to an existing BasicPower norm), new Indi-
vidualConstraintsOnBehavior are set up, regulating the behaviour of the
two parties (duties and privileges of the renter and of the client). On
the contrary, the introduction of a new norm stating that car rental
may be made just to people older than 20 is the execution of a Law-
Plan.
3. Not every agent may execute JurPlans or LawPlans. An agent who can
do that is said to have Power. For example, the owner of a car rental
agency has the Power to rent a car, and, according to the hypothetical
rule mentioned above, anybody older than 20 (possibly, with a driving
license) has the Power to hire a car from an agency. Both of these
Powers are BasicPowers, since they enable the execution of plans that
establish individual duties. On the contrary, only people (or institu-
tions) having some LawPower can modify the minimal age for renting
a car, since this implies a modification of the legal system.
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The result of this conceptual analysis is depicted in Figure 6. The onto-
logical modelling of point 3 above does not appear in the figure, but it is
(partially) reported in Figure 7.
We can now turn to the four Legal Relations concerning Power. Their
interconnections seem less clear than the ones among non-powers.
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Figure 6. Norms concerning Power.
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Figure 7. Authorities: what they do: the author of the Norm is the same as the actor of the
LawPlan that brought about (effect-of) the Norm. This is obtained by exercising some
LawPower, which has as topic the executed LawPlan. Note that there are two Norms
involved here: the first one is the LawPower (a specific type of Norm) which has been
executed; the second one is the ‘new’ Norm that has been created.
ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF PLANS AND NORMS 333
1. X has the POWER to bring about that P (where P is some Legal Rela-
tion), iff there exists an action A such that in case X does perform A,
P is established. In other words A has among its effects P.
2. X has the INABILITY to bring about that P (where P is some Legal
Relation), iff there exists no action A such that in case X does perform
A, P is established.
3. P has the LIABILITY of being brought about by X iff there exists an
action A such that in case X does perform A, P is established.
4. P has the IMMUNITY of being brought about by X iff there exists no
action A such that in case X does perform A, P is established.
Although the picture is simpler than in case of non-power relations (2 is
the ‘inverse’ of 1, 3 is the ‘opposite’ of 1, and 4 is the ‘opposite-inverse’ of 1),
there is just one agent involved, and the terms LIABILITY and IMMU-
NITY apply to Legal Relations, while in ordinary language they are more
commonly used to refer to agents. When one says that agent Y is ‘liable’, it
must be assumed that the speaker refers to a legal relation P involving Y, so
that ‘Y is liable to P’ is interpreted as ‘there is some agent X and some action
Act, such that if X performs Act, then a Legal Relation (P) involving Y is
established’ (or, alternatively, Y is liable to P iff there exist an agent X such
that P has the LIABILITY of being brought about by X; remember that P
‘involves’ Y).
Consequently, since all other relations are easily defined in terms of
POWER, we can now focus on it. In principle, Power does not tell us very
much: there is some action that an agent can perform that has some effect
concerning Legal Relations. But, apart from the final qualification about the
type of effect, this is true for every action: this is the very definition of an
action (or a plan, if the action is complex): a plan is something an agent may
execute to achieve some effect.
So, it is sufficient that such an action be defined, in order to obtain Power:
if the action does not exist, then no Power exists; if the action does exist, then
there is the Power; but provided that the preconditions are satisfied! And the
origin of Power seems to be in the preconditions. As we have already noticed,
usually, preconditions express factual constraints for the execution of an
action: if there is no lamp, you cannot turn on the light. But in this case,
something different is involved: there are some preconditions that are ‘con-
ventional’, in the sense that even if they do not hold, the action appears to be
executable. So, if a judge looks at a person while walking in the street, and
tells him: ‘‘I condemn you to two years’’, the ‘condemn’ action seems to have
been executed, but, of course, this is not so. But where do these further
constraints come from? The answer is that there needs to be some Norm (or a
set of norms) that defines the action. So, a Power depends on the existence of
norms defining an action modifying a Legal Relation. Under this reading, the
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Hohfeldian definition applies without changes: what is important is just to
note that the action A, whose execution can bring about P, is not a ‘natural’
action, but it is a ‘conventional’ action suitably defined.
We must remark that what is in order here is not the introduction of a
Norm (an action which always require an Authority), but the introduction of
a Plan, as, for instance, the ‘selling and buying’ plan. The fact is that,
according to the previous discussion, there is no way to define this plan, other
than having a (set of) norm introducing it, i.e., no JurPlan or LawPlan can
exist, unless it is the topic of some Norm. In other words, an agent cannot
‘invent’ the plan ‘selling and buying’, as he could ‘invent’ a new plan for
organizing a party: the latter can be invented, because its effects are factual
effects (if the party comes out to be a nice party, the plan is a good plan, since
it has achieved the effects it was invented for); but the former cannot be
invented, since it will never have any effect at all, unless some authority
establishes which are these effects, and under which conditions they are
achieved (see Figure 6).
For instance (see Figure 6), a LawPlan for the definition of new types of
contracts can be executed for defining UnsafeContract. This execution has as
its effect the creation of a Norm (the one ruling UnsafeContract). This is a
Power (the one that is possessed by those who can use UnsafeContract) i.e.,
a type of Norm, but it does not seem that there is a newly defined Plan
involved. However, each Norm refers (topic) to a Plan; so, the same holds for
Power; in our example, it is the Plan that must be executed for entering a
UnsafeContract. In general, it is not possible to introduce a Norm without the
associated topic, and the topic of a Power is the Plan that must be executed to
exercise the Power. Note also that we are referring to the creation of norms,
but of course nothing changes substantially in case of modification or can-
cellation of norms.
The definition of UnsafeContract was an example of application of Law-
Power. On the contrary, the execution of the Plan associated with Unsafe-
Contract is just an application of a JurPower. In this case, what come to
existence are just one or more instances of Legal Relations (e.g. new Duties
and Privileges). It is clear that the first type of Power has a much greater
impact on the society, so that it must be much more constrained. So, the
Authority which can do that is restricted to be a carefully defined group of
people (or the King, in our spaghetti example). Of course, the degree of
impact is different for different laws, so that different levels of authority are
usually defined.
The task of determining ‘‘who has power’’ is much more complex than it
might appear. Each and every institutional organization (ranging from the
Constitutional Court to the lowest levels) has received its POWER on the
basis of some set of norms, stating which are the attributions of these
organizations and how they are composed. So, they find their proper place
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within an established social environment. But what about illegal organiza-
tions, for instance Mafia? How can we model the fact that a local Boss has
established that all food shops of a given area must pay 1000 Euro per month
for the protection? It seems that this is not so different, from an ontological
point of view: even in this case, a rule has been introduced, together with its
restrictions (‘‘food’’ shops, ‘‘a given area’’), and plan (pay 1000 Euro), in this
example with a POS polarity. So, there should have been an exercise of
POWER; but which is the source of this POWER? It may be argued that it is
force and violence, but perhaps it is more precise to say that it comes from a
parallel social organization whose grounding is on force and violence. Of
course, the fact that, hopefully, there will be greater resistance to this rule
than to legal rules, depends on an evaluation of the source of the POWER
(commonly agreed Constitutional origin rather than violence), but this does
not affect the ontological status of the rule itself. So, we have that Authority
(i.e., the owner of POWER) gets its status from a social body, a source which
is something different from the Authority itself.
With respect to BasicPower, it must be added that all agents are full of
BasicPower. As legal persons, we are owners of some properties, so that we can
do things with them, as selling them, whose effects are guaranteed by the legal
system, or more precisely, by the BasicPower it assigns to us (unfortunately
just in most cases, not always, see Sen (1999) and the concept of capabilities
he introduces). Now, we can decide thatAuthorities are agents having aPower,
in which case all of us are Authorities with respect to our home or our credit
card, or that the term Authority applies just to agents having some LawPower.
This latter usage seems more akin to the standard one, so we adopt it.
Before turning back to the technical issues, we must observe that some
rules exist independently on any POWER. They are the rules of tradition (not
to be confused with the rules coming from written religious texts). They are
rules the origin of which is unclear: rules to which everybody in a society
usually conforms, just because they exist, and because who does not respect
them is not respected by other people. This situation does not seem to pose
any special problems for the ontological framework we are proposing: the
basic structure of the norm is exactly the same as before. Simply, the author
of the rule is undefined. But a sanction usually exists, and it is the probable
reaction of the other members of the society (in extreme cases, nobody wants
to have any contact with you any more).
Now, we show the placement of Authority in the ontology. Note that
Authority is a material role, since individuals or groups can become or cease
to be authorities, according to the application of some POWER. The main
ideas are depicted in Figures 7 and 8.
In Figure 7, we see that the Author of a Norm is the Actor of the Law-
Plan whose effect is that Norm. In Figure 8, it is shown how one becomes
an Authority, i.e., as an effect of a special type of LawPlan named
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AuthorityCreationPlan. Notice that the second point means that a given
material role (in this case Authority) comes to be true for an individual as an
effect of some action (as Intention in Figure 4).
What is not represented in the figure is that Authority is organized in
levels. This could enable us to state that an Authority may be created just by
another ‘more powerful’ authority. However, it may be argued that in many
cases the creator of an authority need not be an ancestor in the hierarchy: for
instance the commission for the final examination of new judges need not be
viewed as more powerful than the judge, if by MorePowerful we intend that
the decisions of the first prevail on the decisions of the second.
One can wonder if, as there exist AuthorityCreationPlans that create
Authorities, i.e., roles able to exercise a LawPower, there also exists some-
thing able to create entities to which some JurPower is assigned. In fact, they
do exist, and could be named ConstitutivePlans. ConstitutivePlans have as
their effect the creation of new Legally-Constructed-Person (of a given type).
As such, this new Legally-Constructed-Person can execute some actions that
have legal effects. For instance, if a new company is created as the effect of
some legal procedure, the effect is that this new entity inherits all the prop-
erties of the general type Company, including their internal composition and
their ability to do things (as hiring personnel, signing contracts, etc.). Of
course, not everybody has the JurPower to create a new Company, but only
some legal entity, to which this JurPower was assigned by another, previously
established Norm. Notice that we have stated that all of this is an exercise of
JurPower, and not of LawPower; accordingly, the entity who can create a
company need not be an Authority. This may be seen as contrasting the
common use of the term ‘authority’, but it seems to be consistent with the
idea that Authorities create general rules, which is not the case for the crea-
tion of an individual instance of Company. A very different case is the one
where some organism created the very concept of Company, with all of its
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Figure 8. Authorities: how they are created. The fact that some Agent becomes an Authority
is the effect of a particular LawPlan (called Authority-Creation-Plan). Another example of
LawPower is the ConstitutivePower.
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attributions (Privileges, Duties, and so on). This is a true application of
LawPower, a task of some pre-defined Authority.14
5. A case study: fruits
In this section, we report the result of a preliminary study on a legal concept,
i.e., fruits (see Italian Civil Code, art. 820). A Fruit is something that is ob-
tained by somebody as the result of his ownership of something else. For
instance, you obtain the apples if you are the owner of an apple tree, or you
obtain some money if you own a house and you rent it out. Notice that the
presence of fruits does not affect the ownership of the thing. This section aims
at presenting knowledge about fruits appearing in the Italian Civil Code. In
the next section, we will report the representation of a norm concerning fruits,
in order to get a first rough idea about the impact of norms on the ontology.
5.1. GOODS
Goods are defined as a subcategory of Endurants15 (see Figure 9). We
partition the goods in two subcategories: the goods that may undergo a
property relation (SubjectToProperty), and the ones which cannot (Not-
SubjectToProperty). The individuals of the first category can play two roles:
goods that, at some time, are a property of somebody (Asset), and goods
which are temporarily not owned by anybody (ResNullius). The PropertyRel
relation involves a Legally-Constructed-Person (the owner) and a Subject-
ToProperty good (the owned thing: ownee). An Asset is the object of a
SubjectToProperty good, for which there is a PropertyRel relation (i.e., the
prop-of role is restricted to have at least one filler: 1,n). On the contrary, a
ResNullius is not involved in any PropertyRel: prop-of is restricted to have no
filler (0,0) (Figure 9).
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Figure 9. Goods.
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5.2. FRUITS
Fruits are Goods. There are two types of Fruits: NaturalFruits and CivilFruits.
NaturalFruits are goods that are ‘‘detachable’’ parts of some ‘‘original’’ good,
and which originated out of the original good via some natural process
(e.g. the growth of real fruits – apples, peaches, etc. – the birth of a lamb out of
its mother, etc.). In this paper, we will not discuss natural fruits any more.
On the contrary, CivilFruits are Assets, which have changed their owner,
after some more or less complex procedure. The general idea is that some
agent A1 owns (and possesses) some Good G1; then, he can decide to
exchange the possession (maintaining the ownership) against some Good G2,
usually for some limited period of time. A second agent A2 gets the pos-
session of G1 and gives G2 to the first agent. In this situation, G2 is a
CivilFruit of G1. The simplest example is the one of (house) rental, where G1
is the rented house, A1 is the owner of the house, A2 is the tenant and G2 (the
CivilFruit) is the amount paid for the rent. All of this is ruled by some
JurPlan (as a Contract), which must be executed by the involved parties (A1
and A2). As seen before, in order to be authorized to execute a JurPlan, an
agent must have some JurPower. In the example of house rental, this power
has been given to the owner A1 by the original act of buying the house. On
the contrary, the power exercised by A2 is due just to his being a Legally-
Constructed-Person, and to his power on the money he pays for the rental. Of
course, all of this produces new legal relations, in particular, new Privileges
for A2; these are the Privileges associated with the Possession relation, which
has been created as an effect of the execution of the Rent contract.
In Figure 10, we have depicted some of the concepts discussed above. In
particular, it has been made explicit that:
1. CivilFruit, since it is an Asset, has a owner (linked to it via the Proper-
tyRel concept).
2. CivilFruits come from some other Good, which we have called
ExploitedGood (which is a role taken by the Good when it is used in a
FruitProducingContract; see point 10 below).
3. The owner of the ExploitedGood is the same as the owner of the Civil-
Fruit.
4. There exists a special type of Contract involving exactly two contrac-
tors (Contract#2).
5. A subtype of type of Contract#2 is FruitProducingContract. The two
contractors are called the giver and the receiver.
6. FruitProducingContract involves two Goods, called theprimary and the
secondary (in this case, the names are not so clear; we had to keep
apart the good which change its possession, as the rented house – the
primary – from the good that changes ownership – the secondary).
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7. A first effect of a FruitProducingContract is that a new instance of the
Possess relation is created (PossessX in the figure), whose possessor is
the receiver of the FruitProducingContract, and whose possessee is its
primary.
8. A second effect of a FruitProducingContract is that a new instance of
PropertyRel (PropertyY) is established.
9. The owner of PropertyY is the same as the giver of the FruitProducing-
Contract which produced the creation of PropertyY, while the ownee of
PropertyY is the secondary of FruitProducingContract.
10. The primary of FruitProducingContract, which is an Asset, as an effect
of an execution of FruitProducingContract takes the material role of
ExploitedGood, as well as the secondary takes the role of CivilFruit.
It is clear that this is just a simple example. However, it makes explicit
some interesting features; in particular, items 2 and 10 above. Item 2 implies
that there is no CivilFruit without an ExploitedGood; item 10 specifies how
CivilFruits come into being; note that this is not a definition, unless one states
that the only way for an Asset to become a CivilFruit is as an effect of
FruitProducingContract plan, which is not stated here. But apart from
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contracts other than FruitProducingContract, what can easily be made is to
introduce specializations of FruitProducingContract. So, we can have Apart-
mentRental, CarRental, LandRental, BankDeposit, etc. all of which share
(inherit) the general features of FruitProducingContract. In particular, all of
them have in common the effect that some Asset becomes a CivilFruit.
5.3. A NORM ON FRUITS
As an example of norms concerning fruits, we consider part of the article
1477 of the Italian Civil Code: the seller must give the buyer the possible
fruits produced by the sold asset (the ExploitedGood). More precisely, if the
owner of a Good, which is currently playing the role of ExploitedGood sells
that Good, then also the associated Fruits must be given to the buyer.
In Figure 11 we show the relevant part of the representation. The focus of
the example is the Norm instance Give-FruitW, which is a Duty that comes
into being as an effect of the execution of SellExploitedGood, which is a
JurPlan. This instance is analogous to the instance of Property that refers to
the fact that the buyer is now the owner of the sold item, in the sense that
both of them are effects of a selling action. Note also that the Norm
mentioned in the previous paragraph is not represented explicitly, since it is
actually part of the definition of the Power associated with the definition of
SellExploitedGood. In fact, as stated in Section 4, the issuer of the Italian c.c.
article 1477 had the power to (implicitly) define the SellExploitedGood action
(although no name was given to it). Within this definition, the effect of
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Figure 11. A norm about selling ExploitedGoods.
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creating the Duty of transferring the CivilFruits was included, and this is what
is depicted in the figure.
1. Selling is a specific type of Contract #2 (and hence a JurPlan).
2. Among the effects produced by Selling there is a change of Property: a
new instance of Property is established (shown in the figure) as well a
previous property is cancelled (not shown in the figure).
3. In case the sold item is an ExploitedGood, a specific subcategory of Sell
is defined: SellExploitedGood.
4. Beyond the (inherited) effects produced by Sell, SellExploitedGood pro-
duces a further effect: a new Duty (Give-fruitW). The bearer is the same
legal subject who plays the role of seller of the Selling action, but this
need not be specified explicitly, since it is inferred from the general rule
that the bearer is the has-agent of the topic of the Norm (i.e., the gi-
ver).
5. On the contrary, it is explicitly stated that the giver of the Civil-Fruit is
the same as the seller of the ExploitedGood.
6. The Assets which must be given by the seller to the buyer are the Civil-
Fruits that are produced by the asset which has been sold.
7. According to the Italian civil code, when a duty created by an obliga-
tion is violated by an agent, he must repay for the damage created to
the beneficiary: the sanction associated to the Give-fruit duty is thus to
repay the buyer for the damage due to not giving the fruits of the sold
assets.
6. Ontological models of the legal system
Classical formalizations of legal reasoning are based on deontic logic, as von
Wright (1951), Alchourron (1993), van der Torre and Tan (1995), Prakken
and Sergot (1997), to quote just a few examples. More recently, ontologies
have been adopted as a means to give structure to the legal domain, beyond
the basic deontic primitives. Ontologies have been used in a wide range of
applications, from legal advice [see the application of the CLIME ontology to
Maritime Law (Winkels et al. 1999; Boer et al. 2001), the representation of
cadastral data and norms ruling the Real Property Transactions
(Stuckenschmidt et al. 2001) and the reasoning about the eligibility to legal
aid for the indigent (Zeleznikow and Stranieri 2001)], to the access to legal
information (Winkels et al. 2000; Tiscornia 2001). Various studies aimed at
proposing ontological primitives (Mommers, 2001) or at comparing and
evaluating different approaches to legal ontologies (Visser and Bench-Capon
1998; Bench-Capon 2001). In this section, we overview three models, which
seem more relevant for setting the context of the present work.
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In various papers, Breuker, Valente and Winkels (BVW) have described a
‘functional model’ of legal systems. The model, which is very articulated, and
covers many aspects of legal knowledge and reasoning, is based on the idea
that
‘‘the legal system as a whole (and therefore each of its components) exists
to accomplish a certain function, in order to obtain certain social goals. The
legal system is thus viewed as an entity with a certain internal structure,
behaving in an environment, and that was designed to work in a certain way
in order to be able to accomplish specified social goals. The main function
of the legal system is to change or influence society in specific directions,
determined by certain social goals’’ (Breuker et al. 1997).
The goal of BVW’s research activity is to provide a general framework for
law, including the legal reasoning necessary to assess the cases. The knowl-
edge required has been classified according to its function: Normative
knowledge (it prescribes behaviour and defines a standard of comparison for
the social reality), Meta-legal knowledge (it organizes the relative position of
norms, coping with conflicts, validity, etc.), World knowledge (it provides the
background on which norms are built and deals with both entities and
behaviours), Responsibility knowledge (it refers to the links between causal
relations and legal responsibility of agents), Reactive knowledge (how the
legal system reacts to the behaviour of agents; i.e., with sanctions or re-
wards), and Creative knowledge (enabling the system to define new entities
and new types of entities). A general schema of legal reasoning involves
taking in input a case, ‘translating’ its description in legal terms (i.e.,
according to legal categories), then ‘matching’ it against the existing norms in
order to verify if there has been a violation, then assessing the responsibilities
of agents and possibly choosing the reactions of the legal system.
It is clear that BVW’s perspective is much wider than ours. The present
article, in fact, contributes mainly to the definition of the links between
Normative knowledge and World knowledge (with a possible future impact
on Responsibility knowledge). What is especially relevant in the present
context is BVW’s view of model-based reasoning; their approach moves
away from pure heuristic reasoning towards a full representation of the
principles and contents of legal knowledge. But they claim that full model-
based reasoning is not adequate for the task at hand, so that ‘‘weaker
versions of model-based reasoning that do not require full envisioning’’
(Valente et al. 1999, p. 1082) are preferable.16 It cannot be denied that full-
blown model based reasoning is hardly feasible in a domain as complex as
legal reasoning. However, it seems that some further steps towards this end
can be useful to approach the goal of linking legal concepts to world
knowledge.
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In particular, we follow the suggestion of matching real-world situations
against legal knowledge, but we also claim that this match can produce
deeper insights on what happened and why, if the mental processes that lead
people to behave in a given way are properly taken into account. Also in this
respect we follow BVW, who state that:
‘‘Primary norms address individual behavior (instances of behaviour) in
the world by means of reference to patterns of behavior’’ (Valente et al.
1999, p. 1093).
and
‘‘. . . in law the causal reasoning is contingent upon notions of responsi-
bility, i.e., one has to take into account also the concepts ‘intention’ and
‘knowledge/belief’’’ (Valente et al. 1999, p. 1102).
Our view is that many of the concepts strictly linked to the notion of agency
(i.e., behaviour, intention, knowledge/belief; see the research on BDI agents)
are relevant in legal modelling, but they still lack an adequate formalization
in terms of ontological primitives. We claim that BDI models, together with
their involvement of desires and intentions, are one of the essential bricks
required to expand and extend BVW’s analysis. In fact, in assessing a case,
it is not only necessary to decide if one or more norm have been broken,
but it is also necessary to understand the reasons why an agent did break
them. And this cannot be done, unless one has a view of the reasoning
mechanism that led the agent to choose that specific line of behaviour. This
is also made clear in the description of Agent causation in (Lehmann et al.
2003):
‘‘The agreement around cases of agent causation is not reached as easily
as in case of physical causation. This is due to the problem of detecting the
beliefs, desires and intentions of the agent that starts the physical process.
Usually a non intentional action does not fully qualify the agent that
performs it as an agential cause, despite him being the physical cause’’
(Lehmann et al. 2003, pp. 21–22).
The present article tries to specify which is the link between an agent’s
intentions, her/his behaviour and the norms that affect them. In this sense, it
can be seen as an extension of BVW’s model, although our focus is more on
the reasoning of the agent than on the reasoning of the legal system that has
the task of inferring (abducing) it from the agent’s behaviour.
Similar comments apply to the system described in (Kralingen et al. 1999),
where the ‘‘conceptual frame-based ontology’’ includes three types of frames:
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norm frames, act frames, and concept-description frames. In the description
of the Norm Frames, the authors state:
‘‘A legal subject attempts to stay within the law and attempts to avoid the
breach of norms. The reason for this behaviour, whether it is social
pressure or threat of sanctions, is not important to our discussion of
norms’’ (Kralingen et al. 1999, p. 1133).
And, in fact, the norm frames include five slots, which describe the subject of
the norm, the legal modality of the norm (duty-imposing, permission or
power-conferring), the action to which the norm refers to (What must be
done or forborne?), and some extra conditions of application (place and
time). As we have seen, we assume that a sixth slot is required, i.e., the
sanction. In our view, this is essential in the task of explaining how the
existence of a norm affects the behaviour of agents, who have to take into
account the various aspect of the situation (including the existence of norms
and possible sanctions) in order to choose a line of behaviour. Actually, the
act frame includes three slots that are related to agent behaviour: cause, aim,
and intentionality, but it is not clear if they have any impact on the actual
model. In any case, the glosses reveal that these terms are used in a rather
different way than we do (see Section 4).
In order to give an example of the importance of a deep model of actions,
we may refer to the domain used in (Kralingen et al. 1999), i.e., the Imperial
College Library Regulation (ICLR). One of the norms refers to the maximum
number of books that can be borrowed. In particular, it states that that
number cannot be exceeded; it is split into two norms, the first ones specifies
that a borrower cannot take a book, if s/he has already reached the limit; the
second one says that the librarian should not lend a book to a person who has
reached the limit. Since the system has the goal of assessing if some norm has
been broken, this means that, in fact, norms can be broken. But why? If this
can happen, then the librarian must have had some reasons for doing that (an
error or a principled choice). In our view, the librarian must also have some
reason for not always breaking the rule (sanctions); but if he did that, it could
depend on the fact that the borrower was told by her thesis advisor that she
had to read a book before the day after, that she has reached the limit, that
she lives very far from the library, and that she promised to bring back one or
more book the day after. In such a case, we assume that the librarian made
the right choice, even if it goes against the norm. And this must be taken into
account when the case is assessed, if any action has to be taken against him.
A third model which is relevant here is the one presented in Hage and
Verheij (1999). It is based on three conceptual primitives, i.e., states of affairs,
events and rules. States of affairs concern any type of piece of reality (as ‘John
is a thief’, or ‘A minor cannot make a valid will’), and are changed by events
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(as ‘John taking away the car of Gerald’ or ‘An international treaty being
ratified’). There are subcategories of events:
‘‘A special kind of events are acts: events that consist of the intentional
behaviour of an individual. A special category of acts are the so-called
juristic acts’’ (Hage and Verheij, 1999, p. 1049).
In our view, one of the most important features of Hage and Verheij proposal is
the parallel existing between the pair <event,causality> and the pair
<rule,constitution>. The events change the state of affair ‘obtaining’
(i.e holding) before the event into a new state of affair obtaining after the event.
And the new state of affairs is causally related (via its ‘effects’) to the event. On
the contrary, two state of affairs (that occur simultaneously) are related via a
constitution relation (called supervenience) if there is a rule establishing the
existence of this relation. For instance, the event ‘signing of a contract’ is
causally related to the state of affair ‘the contract is signed’, and ‘the two con-
tractors are under a contractual bond’ supervenes to the latter. It seems that the
concept of supervenience is strictly related to what Pollack (1990) called ‘gen-
eration’: in her case, the difference is mainly a matter of description, one of the
example being ‘press the switch’ and ‘turn the light on’: they are not different
actions (the agent has not done two different things), but the first only produces
the second if some conditions apply (there is electric power, thewires are not cut,
etc.). In the case of supervenience, we have that the conditions for the existence
of the relation are not physical, but conventional: it is not different to have the
contract signed and to have two individuals under a contractual bond, provided
that there is a rule stating the correspondence; so, it is mainly a problem of
description of a state of affairs which actually is a single one. The ‘conven-
tionality’ of ‘supervenience’ is of paramount importance, and has been dis-
cussed in Section 4. What is also interesting is that the chain of (inverse)
supervenience starting from the signing of a contract passes through ‘one of the
two contractors (A) is under an obligation towards the other (B)’, and ends in ‘A
ought to perform some action’: again an explicit reference to agent behaviour.
According to the previous discussion, we claim that actions, the way
people use their knowledge about actions, and the way people decide which
goal(s) to pursue via their actions, are all elements that have a basic role in
defining a legal ontology. The next section is devoted to the introduction of a
few proposals about the representation of plans in ontologies.
7. Ontological models of plans
Although planning is one of the main topics of AI research, not many
attempts have been made to provide a principled formalization of planning
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concepts. Presumably, one of the main difficulties stands on the fact that
knowledge about planning is mostly embodied in procedures, which are
notoriously hard to represent declaratively (as an ontology demands17).
The input to a planning procedure (planner) includes at least the following
elements: a set of goals of the planning agent, an expressions of the prefer-
ences of the agent, a description of the current situation, and background
knowledge. The latter, in turns, includes both knowledge about entities and
relations existing in the world, and knowledge about the actions that can be
performed in the world (with conditions for their execution and, possibly
non-deterministic, effects). The output of a planning procedure is an inten-
tion, i.e., a sequence (more or less detailed) of actions that the agent has
decided to execute; so, an intention is a specific plan of actions which the
agent has committed to. In principle, the planner has to produce all possible
plans that enable the agent to achieve one or more of his goals (using the
goals, the current situation and the background knowledge), and then must
choose one of them (using the preferences), which becomes the agent inten-
tion. Of course, the process cannot be carried out in this way, because of the
combinatorial explosion in the number of candidate plans; so actual planners
become rather complex, because of the need to reduce the search space via
heuristics and interleaving of various steps.
The most extensive attempt to formalize the notion of plan has been made
within the Planning Initiative of DARPA, resulting in Shared Planning and
Activity Representation (SPAR) (Polyak and Tate 1998, 1999). The results of
this study are impressive, and their main features are the coverage of the
formalization (which includes also probabilities and uncertainty) and range
of sources which have contributed to the final model, among which repre-
sentation languages [as PIF: Lee et al. (1998)], tools [as Prodigy: Carbonell
et al. (1991)] and true ontologies [as Ozone: Smith and Becker (1997)]; see
Polyak and Tate (1998, pp. 3–4) for a complete listing. However, the strength
of SPAR seems to bring with itself some weaknesses: the fact that various
requirements come mainly from industrial environments (e.g. the need for
standards in process specifications), and the necessity to quickly approach the
core of planning has made the top-level ontology somewhat confused,
including as sisters (under the topmost concept ‘entity’) concepts rather
dishomogenous, as Environment, Activity, TimePoint, Issue, EvaluationCri-
terion,WorldModel,WorldModelSpecification, to quote just some of them. It
seems clear that many of the concept and features appearing in the SPAR
proposal are of paramount importance; but is seems equally clear that the
connections to a foundational ontology need be refined.
A model which suffers from some of the drawbacks of SPAR (i.e., unclear
connections to a top-level ontology) is PLANET (Gil and Blythe 2000).
However, it includes a very nice feature, i.e., an explicit representation of the
partial structures which must be built and managed during the planning
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process. PLANET includes four main structures: planning-problem-contexts,
which describe the background knowledge, the constraints that the resulting
plans must satisfy, and the initial situation, plan-task-descriptions, which
refers to plan templates (i.e., knowledge about actions) and plan tasks (i.e.,
instantiated portions of plans), goal-specifications, which describes the goals
the planner must try to achieve, and plans. We want to stress here just that
there is a relation between plans and planning-problem-context called candi-
date-plans, which carries information about the suitability of the plan for that
problem; the possible values of this feature are unexplored, rejected, feasible,
selected. So, it is modelled the fact that plans are built as solution hypotheses
for a problem, and are then evaluated, on the basis of some criteria, in order
to make a final choice. This is especially important in our model too, where
norms have exactly the role of further constraints on plans, affecting the final
choice of the agent.
8. Conclusions
In this article, we have presented an ontological model of norms, based on
the behaviour of agents. We have shown that norms can be characterized as
constraints on behaviour, i.e., as statements specifying what an agent can and
cannot do, and what happens when a norm is broken. The basic idea is that
agents choose a line of behaviour according to the utility they may gain; and
usually the breach of a norm produces a decrease in the estimated utility,
because of the risk of being sanctioned.
In order to include in the ontology knowledge about behaviour, we have
provided a sketch of an ontological representation of plans and intentions,
showing how a Norm can affect the planning process: the presence of a Norm
can urge an agent to adopt a given line of behaviour (complying with the
norm) instead of another (breaching the norm). This is obtained by intro-
ducing the notion of utility and by letting the agent determine his intention
according to the expected maximal utility.
Although the article has mainly addressed primary norms, by also
showing how they are related to the basic Hohfeldian Legal Relations, it has
also shown that the proposed model covers authorities, i.e., it enables one to
express explicitly the role of authorities in a legal system, and the way they
are created. Finally, we have shown how the model applies to a specific case
study (Goods and Fruits).
Two final comments concern the degree of coverage of the article with
respect to the various components of a legal system and the complexity of the
representation. As we have stated in the introduction, the goal of this paper is
not to develop a general model of a legal system (see the models described in
Section 6), but only to give an ontological characterization of a specific
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aspect, i.e., the role of primary norms. In principle, norms are just a small
portion of such a model, although they are a very important component, as
we have argued in Section 2. Representing norms in an ontologically plau-
sible way is the first step towards the implementation of a general model,
which can be grounded on the behaviour of agents; the agents are the entities
which populate the societies that are being regulated by legal systems and
adopting them as the foundation for the representation is, in our view, the
main contribution of this work. Of course, other agents do exist, most
noticeably the judges and the members of the courts, that must decide about
the behaviour of other agents; also judges (as all agents) are subject to norms,
but they also have the role of assessing cases; this is a particular activity, that
is not addressed in this paper, but that can be arguably assimilated to a kind
of diagnostic reasoning: given some evidence (symptoms), classify the situ-
ation according to the categories appearing in the system. Since, in doing
that, the court must respect some norms, it seems reasonable to assume that
the model applies to it equally well, provided that a suitable representation is
associated with the process of assessing the case.
Finally, the complexity of the representation. It is a matter of taste if a
graphical representation (as the one we have adopted in this paper) is more or
less readable than an equivalent representation respecting the linear syntax of
a terminological language (see Appendix A). However, independently of the
graphical way the ontology is presented, there is the usual contrast between
the expressivity of the language and the computational complexity of the
reasoning procedures. We have argued in favour of a language including
some constructs that makes the language computationally hard. Although
this is not the focus of the paper, we must stress that this appears to be
unavoidable, unless one is able to show that the same concepts can be rep-
resented with simpler constructs, or that the knowledge expressed by these
concepts can be left out of the ontology without loss of information. We
believe that neither is the case, so that we hope that suitable heuristics can
help a reasoner to obtain results within acceptable time limits.
Notes
1 A complex network of physiological causes and effects with respect to ‘‘I feel bad’’.
2 ‘‘Since the norm is the most salient construct of the legal domain, we have selected it
as the point of departure for our intermediate representation’’ (Kralingen et al.
1999, p. 1128).
3 In the text, we sometime use the category names in the plural. Although this is
imprecise, we believe it makes the reading more fluent.
4 By ‘considering’, we mean here the process of moving around (e.g. from LTM to
STM) pieces of descriptions.
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5 More formally, by taking relations as functions, we have: "x [Intention(x) fi
(in-mind-of(x)=has-agent(p-effect-of(x))] Of course, one can preserve relations,
but the formula becomes less readable.
6 Often called explicit permissions (Boella and van der Torre 2003).
7 Note, however, that in Gangemi et al. (2003), Duty, Right, etc. are subcategories of
Regulation, i.e., sisters of Law and Obligation.
8 For different positions on the role of sanctions in law, see Kelsen (1945) and Hart
(1961).
9 The term topic is inspired to Ross (1968)’s ‘‘theme’’.
10 The fact that only DUTY appears in the figure is not intended to mean that all
other relations are reduced to DUTY + polarity. Only DUTY is relevant in this
example, but the other relations are there as sisters of DUTY.
11 Since Planning is an Action, it is the domain of the has-agent relation; however,
since Planning is a mental action, its agent could more properly be called author
rather than actor, since the effect is a mental representation. Consequently, we
could say that the author of a plan and its actor do coincide. The ‘invented’ plan
could actually involve more than one ‘actor’, but we simplify the matter by calling
actor the primary participant (the host of the dinner, and not the cook, the
waiters, etc).
12 We are dealing here with ‘normative’ rules. In other cases, the sanction may be
replaced by a reward.
13 This is consistent with Hart (1961), p. 33, who characterizes power-conferring
norms as recipes for creating duties.
14 Actually, an organization as a Company can also create an internal system of rules
that constrain and organize the behaviour of its personnel. So, in principle, it can
also be seen as an Authority. A partial solution is to create a special type of
LegalSubject which refers to aggregates having a rich internal organization, some
of whose internal organism have the role of Authorities.
15 As one referee pointed to us, the specification of what may constitute a Good from
a legal point of view requires a more careful analysis. It is unclear, for instance,
whether a Description may be a Good, while it is certain that some kinds of
Activities (i.e., services) certainly are Goods. Since the focus of this example is on
Fruits, and, at least in principle, any Good can produce Fruits, we leave open the
problem of a better characterization of Goods.
16 On this point see also Bench-Capon and Visser (1996).
17 It is worth stating here again that we are using the world ‘ontology’ a-critically.
Breuker pointed to us that ‘‘Planning is a problem solving task, so the perspective
is an epistemological, rather than an ontological one’’. This comment reflects the
view that any ‘role’ taken by a physical entity in a process concerns epistemology,
i.e., the way people conceptualize the process. We share Breuker’s view, but we
cannot disregard that mental processes, as planning, have, as a physical sub-
stratum, the agents’ brains, which are ontological objects. However, the literature
in the field of philosophy of mind concerning the relationships between mind and
brain is vast and growing at increasing speed. Consequently, we simply declare
that we agree that a ‘description’ of mental processes in terms of intentionality,
beliefs, etc. should more properly fall within the domain of epistemology, how-
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ever, we keep the term ‘ontology’ as the only term that can be used without an
in-depth discussion, which is outside the scope of this article.
Appendix A: Example of LOOM representation
In order to give an idea of the actual meaning of the structures presented in
the figures, we report here a LOOM version of the contents of Fig-
ure 10, assuming that the semantics of LOOM is clearly defined (see [http://
www.isi.edu/isd/LOOM/LOOM-HOME.html]). Some comments are re-
ported within the definitions, using the: annotations slot. In order to simplify
the match between the figure and the LOOM definition, we have split the
latter into three boxes, which have no representational function. The fourth
box reports an example of a LOOM query; when executed, it retrieves all civil
fruits known to the system. This last box has been included to show that,
although LOOM does not allow for role constraints, they can be enforced in
a query, as constraints on the data to be retrieved.
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Appendix B: The planning process
In this appendix, we present a simple model of the planning process. This has
to be viewed as a preliminary attempt at an ontological representation of a
complex activity as planning. We describe here the features that are depicted
in Figure 12. Note that the content of the figure is a sort of procedure;
although a procedure is inherently a ‘procedural’ representation of a process,
its expression in a programming language also has a declarative (descriptive)
flavour, since it can be inspected as a static object (for instance by a com-
piler). In order to provide an ontological representation, we need the
equivalent of some basic programming concepts, as input parameter,
Perdurant
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Agent 
-Role
has-agent
in-mind-of 
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Update 
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Figure 12. Structure of the Planning activity.
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variable, sequence of operations, loop, etc. A first proposal appears in
DOLCE in the section related to the Task concept (Masolo et al. 2003,
pp. 238–241). Here, we have adopted the following graphical conventions:
1. Planning is linked to its ‘body’ (the large box) via a dashed arrow.
This notion corresponds to the ‘decomposition’ of a complex action in
its steps. In DOLCE, we have that a Course (which is a Description)
sequences a Perdurant. Since a Task is a subcategory of Course, the
large box in the figure can be taken as the complex Task that sequences
(the dotted upward large arrow) the Planning Perdurant.
2. The sequence of operations is represented as lines ending in a black
diamond. Some lines having this form enter the ‘body’ box: they are
the input data, and the small box they enter is the parameter name
(ex. GoalsX); some of these arrows exit the box: they are the result (the
return values).
3. The sequence of steps is an alternation of ovals (e.g. FindPlans) and
rectangles (e.g. PlansX); the former are sub-procedures (steps, or Sub-
Tasks), while the latter are intermediate results (local variables).
4. In particular, FindPlans retrieves from the knowledge of the planning
agent all the Plans that have as p-effects one or more of the Goals in
GoalsX.
5. The Cycle-Until box expresses a loop (in DOLCE, it is a subcategory
of Complex-Task): all the steps inside the box are repeated until the
exit condition (StartExecution?) is satisfied. The predicate is assumed
to be true if a single plan has remained in the focus (FocusedP) and
the initial steps of the focused plan are executable; this last condition
holds if that step refers to a ‘basic action’, i.e., to an action that can
drive the actuators of the agent.
6. EvaluateAndChoose aims at evaluating the foreseeable utility of the dif-
ferent alternatives (see Section 2.4); it gets as input the preferences of
the planning agent (PrefsX).
7. Expand takes into account all remaining focused plans (which may be
more than one in case no commitment has been made), and finds ways
for executing non-basic actions. After Expand, the resulting Plans are
more specific than the original ones.
8. It is specified (via the usual constraints on roles) that the input goals
(GoalsX) are the ones of the planning agent. A similar specification
should be given for the preferences; we have omitted it because of
space constraints.
9. Finally, it is specified that the final plan which is the result of the
whole process (IntendP) is the one that becomes the intention of the
planning agent (has-intention-on). This is the connection (effects of
planning) to the concepts appearing in Figure 4.
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